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UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS AT LITTLE ROCK
LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME 3 1980 NUMBER 2
THE FACTS OF A CASE
Irving Younger*
The man whose name is the name of this occasion was a
farmer and a lawyer. Of agricultural affairs my ignorance is total,
and I can think of nothing to say. About the law, however, I have
been struggling for two and a half decades now to become better
informed. I profess no success in the enterprise, but I am able to
report that the effort has produced a vagrant thought or two, wan-
dering mote-like through the profound vacuum separating my ears.
It is with such a thought or two that I shall try to bemuse the
minutes which have been allotted me, hoping that the spectacle of
a former trial lawyer and judge teasing out a description of the
phenomena hidden away in a phrase commonplace among those in
the litigating branch of the profession will not be thought a wholly
inappropriate commemoration of the memory of Ben J. Altheimer.
The phrase is "the facts of a case." In that or some variant
form each of us heard it during the first class we attended on the
first day of our first term at law school. "Mr. Smith," the instruc-
tor in torts may have said, "what were the facts in Brown v.
Kendall?"1 Or in property, "Miss Jones, state the facts of Armory
* Irving Younger is the Samuel S. Leibowitz Professor of Trial Techniques at the Cor-
nell Law School.
This is the text of the second Ben J. Altheimer Lecture, as delivered at the law school
of the University of Arkansas at Little Rock on October 19, 1979. Copyright © by Irving
Younger 1980.
1. 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
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v. Delamirie.' '2 And we palpitatingly did, thus commencing that
progress in subtlety which marks both the development of a lawyer
and the growth of the law. "The facts were," recites Mr. Smith,
"that Kendall tried to separate two fighting dogs by beating them
with a stick. He raised the stick over his shoulder and struck
Brown in the eye. Brown sued Kendall for the resulting damages."
"In the Armory case," says Miss Jones, "a chimney sweep found a
jewel in the dust. He took it to a jeweler to be examined and when
the jeweler refused to return it, sued for it in King's Bench." Mr.
Smith and Miss Jones know that these are the facts of the case
because the opinion in the casebook says they are. How the author
of the opinion came by those facts is a question beyond their
fathoming on that first day of law school, and understandably.
"Ars longa est, vita brevis," Seneca says, quoting Hippocrates. Or
as our own Geoffrey Chaucer puts it:s
The lyf so short, the craft so long to lerne,
Th'assay so hard, so sharp the conquerynge....
But I wander. The facts, we tend to think at the beginning, are like
acorns on an oak tree. When they are ripe, they drop to the
ground. If you want some, just bend down and pick them up. Ob-
serve how they are arranged. Should they fall into the pattern we
designate "negligence," Brown wins his suit against Kendall. If the
pattern is that of one of the bundle of rights called "property,"
Armory prevails over Delamirie. Why, there's nothing to it but
learning the patterns. That, I repeat, is what we tend to think at
the beginning. It is what teachers of the law seem to have thought
for a very long time.4
With experience and reflection comes a deeper comprehension.
Facts do not grow on trees, we learn. They must be investigated
and proved. Cases are more often won before a jury than in the
appellate courtroom. Sometimes the facts fall into a preexisting
pattern, but sometimes a pattern is devised to their configuration,
in accordance with whatever their arrangement happens to be. The
facts, in short, are just as obscure as the law, just as malleable, just
as controversial, and in determining the outcome of a lawsuit or
2. 1 Strange 505 (K.B. 1722).
3. G. CHAUCER, THE PARLUME OF FowLs, lines 1 and 2.
4. E.g., Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell of Harvard said in 1886, "First, that law
is a science; second, that all the available materials of that science are contained in printed
books." CENTENMAL HIsroYv OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 1817-1917, at 231 (1918).
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the elaboration of a rule, more important than paltry logic. This
each of us has learned, some of us long since, and this teachers of
the law began to learn about half a century ago.5
In acknowledging our hard-won intelligence about facts, I
would not wish to be understood as embracing an untempered
complacency. There is still something of the acorn on the oak tree
about the way we look at facts. "Obscure, malleable, controversial,
and important, of course," we say to ourselves, "but when you
finally get down to it, a fact is a fact." It is a single category or
class of things, as the Oxford English Dictionary tells us:
Fact . . . (7) Law. The circumstances or incidents of a case,
looked at apart from their legal bearing.
Or if this is too general to suit, one might follow Bentham in as-
signing facts to one of two categories. A fact, says the great Jer-
emy, is either a state of things, that is, an existence, or a motion,
that is, an event.'
Now, I cherish the Oxford English Dictionary and I prostrate
myself before Jeremy Bentham, but surely, I whisper, things as in-
teresting as facts are something more than'merely that. All de-
scriptions are somewhat blunt by the standard of what they de-
scribe, yet should it not be possible to talk about facts with greater
sharpness of point and edge than do the dictionary and the philos-
opher? I think so, and propose to start right now.
Gazing out over the numberless host of the tribe of facts, my
mind's eye distinguishes among them no fewer than ten separate
types or varieties. Others with a keener faculty may* see more. If
they do, I hope that they will add their observations to mine. Ten,
however, is a fair, round number, quite enough to justify this rough
attempt at a taxonomy of the facts of a case.
First. Every normal human being possesses the five senses of
sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell. Through these senses we re-
ceive data from the world outside us. When someone takes the
stand and testifies to what he saw, heard, touched, tasted, or
smelled, the witness is presenting to the judge or jury a fact of my
first sort, that is, a fact which was the object of a witness' sensory
perceptions. In Brown v. Kendall, for example, a witness might
testify that he saw two dogs fight, that Kendall stepped between
5. See, e.g., J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).
6. I have here put into a sentence the burden of a long section of the Rationale of
Judicial Evidence. 6 JElWMY BENTHAM'S WORKS 217 (Bowring ed. 1843).
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them, that he raised his stick over his shoulder, and that the stick
hit Brown in the eye. In Armory v. Delamirie, a witness might tes-
tify that he saw the chimney sweep pick a jewel out of the gutter,
that he accompanied the sweep to the jeweler, that the sweep gave
the jewel to the jeweler, who refused to give it back. Facts of this
first sort were once, as these two old cases suggest, virtually the
only sort of fact likely to be encountered in litigation. Today, it is
not uncommon to run into any of the nine other sorts.
Second. The fact would be a fact of the first sort, the object of
a witness' sensory perceptions, save that the witness' perceptions
were aided or enhanced by some device in ordinary use. For exam-
ple: the witness says that, through a pair of binoculars, he watched
the airplane fly into the side of a distant mountain; or the witness
says that, although he is appallingly near-sighted, he was able to
see the stop sign some twenty-five feet away because he was wear-
ing his eyeglasses at the time; or the witness says that, while he is
hard of hearing, his hearing-aid was in place and functioning that
morning and hence the witness heard what the plaintiff said to the
defendant.
Third. The fact would be a fact of the first sort, the object of a
witness' sensory perceptions, save that the witness' perceptions
were aided or enhanced or altogether made possible by some de-
vice or procedure not in ordinary use but requiring special skill to
employ. For example: the witness says that he felt the texture of
the pebble on the far side of the moon, having got there by rocket
and lunar landing module; or the witness says that he saw the ma-
terial blocking the plaintiff's larynx by looking through a medical
instrument introduced for the purpose into the plaintiff's mouth
and down his throat; or the witness says that he heard what Chair-
man Brezhnev said to President Kosygin as they went through the
line in the Kremlin coffee shop by plugging into the super-sensitive
parabolic microphone maintained by the CIA on Magazine Moun-
tain in western Arkansas.
Fourth. The fact would be a fact of the first sort, the object of
a witness' sensory perceptions, save for the chance circumstance
that no one exists or can be found who is able to take the stand
and say, in effect, I perceived it. For example: two cars moving in
opposite directions collide on a two-lane highway in the middle of
the night. No bystander sees the accident and neither driver sur-
vives. It is necessary at trial for plaintiff to prove that the car
driven by defendant's decedent was on the wrong side of the road.
348 [Vol. 3:345
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Because this is a sort of fact different from the first, second, or
third, the plaintiff will need to proceed differently.
Fifth. The fact would be a fact of the first sort, the object of a
witness' sensory perceptions, save that there are impediments to
producing a witness who will say, in effect, I perceived it, impedi-
ments which the technology of the future may permit our profes-
sional posterity to overcome. For example: how did Lincoln deliver
the Gettysburg Address? Was his voice high or low, his pace slow
or fast, his posture rigid or relaxed? It is presently impossible to
call someone to the stand to testify, "I was there. This is what I
saw. This is what I heard." Some day, conceivably, the technicians
will have come up with a time-machine, by the help of which a fact
of this fifth sort will be converted to a fact of the third sort. Put
your investigator in the time-machine and send him back to the
cemetery in Pennsylvania on November 19, 1863. Have him look
and listen, then retrieve him to the present, march him onto the
witness stand, and tell him to report what he perceived. Another
example: what is the shape and approximate size of the Loch Ness
monster? Those are facts capable of perception, but as yet the en-
gineers have failed to contrive the television camera and floodlights
able to pierce the sedimentary gloom of those prehistoric Scottish
waters. They will before long, and then, by the aid of those devices,
someone will perceive the facts in question. They will be facts of
either the second or third sort, depending upon the complexity of
the equipment. Of course, should Nessie lumber out of the depths
some Sunday noon in full view of half a dozen dominies on their
way home from kirk, there would be no need for the assistance of
engineers: we would simply put our dominies on the witness stand
to tell what they saw. It would be a case of facts of the first sort,
plain and unadorned. In the present state of affairs, to recapitu-
late, the monster is an example of a fact of this fifth sort, incapable
of being perceived due to the prevailing limits of technology.
Sixth. The fact cannot be a fact of any of the preceding sorts
because by its nature the fact is immune to perception, no matter
what technological aids are brought to bear. Here I presuppose
that some kinds of machinery cannot be invented, that science is
able to tell us only that the thing is impossible. For example: it is
not and never will be possible to see an electron make a quantum
jump from one energy level to another, or to hear the noise at the
center of the sun, or to taste the vegetables grown on a planet of a
star 100 million light years away. Still, lawyers must once in a
19801 349
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while try to prove facts of this sixth sort. Lest you scoff too soon,
imagine yourself the prosecutor in a case of murder by explosion.
The evidence showing that the fragments of the bomb came from a
closet of materials accessible to the defendant rests upon a tech-
nique of the physics laboratory called neutron activation analysis.
To persuade the judge to admit that evidence, you will need to
prove facts very like an electron making a quantum jump from one
energy level to another.
Seventh. The fact is of a very different sort from the preced-
ing six. This seventh sort of fact is not in any immediate sense a
part of the physical universe either past or present. It is therefore
impossible in principle to prove the fact through a witness' percep-
tions. But neither is the fact a fiction. The fact figures in the real
universe, though it lacks tangibility. For example: in a murder
trial, the defendant admits shooting the victim but says the re-
volver went off by accident. The prosecution contends that the de-
fendant pulled the trigger intending to kill. The jury must deter-
mine the fact of mens rea. It is real. It exists. Yet it has no
corporeal substance.8
Eighth. The fact is of a very different sort from the preceding
seventh and from the six before that. It is not a part of any uni-
verse, the external one of physical reality or the internal one of
state of mind. Instead, this eighth sort of fact is simply a question
of definition, a point of language. For example: a witness testifies
to facts of the first sort, namely, that the defendant-driver was, at
a moderate rate of speed, approaching the last car of a line of cars
stopped for a red light. A youngster hiding behind a tree at the
side of the road threw a handful of pebbles at the defendant's car.
They landed on the roof and rear window with a noise like a burst
of a machinegun fire. Startled, the defendant looked around to see
what was happening. He saw nothing. While seeing nothing,
neither was he watching the stopped car ahead of him. Returning
his head and eyes to the forward position, the defendant instantly
saw that he had moved dangerously near the stopped car. He
jammed on the brakes. Too late. The defendant's car rear-ended
the stopped car. From these facts of the first sort the jury must
now determine a fact of the eighth sort. Do these facts having to
7. See United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994
(1971).
8. See United States v. Staffs, 553 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1977).
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do with the defendant-driver's conduct, all objects of perception,
fit the meaning of the phrase "reasonable care in driving a car," a
fact not of perception but of definition?
Ninth. This sort of fact would be a fact of the eighth sort, save
that the word or phrase the meaning of which may or may not
encompass the circumstances of the case is not a word or phrase in
ordinary use. Rather, the word or phrase is part of the specialized
vocabulary of some science or discipline other than the law. A jury
determining whether a certain corporation possessed monopoly
power, for example, takes a phrase used and defined by the disci-
pline of economics and decides whether the evidence warrants a
finding that the phrase is fairly to be applied to the corporation at
bar. Similarly, a jury determining whether the victim of an acci-
dent suffers from "traumatic neurosis" takes the psychiatrist's def-
inition of the phrase and decides whether the evidence brings the
plaintiff within its terms.
Tenth. This sort of fact would be a fact of the eighth sort, save
that the word or phrase the meaning of which may or may not
encompass the circumstances of the case comes from the jargon of
the law. For example, his honor charges the jury as follows: "Mem-
bers of the jury, the law defines the crime of murder in the first
degree as... . You determine what the defendant did [facts of the
first, second and third sort] and what was in his mind [a fact of the
seventh sort], and if these facts comport with the definition I have
given you, then you must find the defendant guilty of murder in
the first degree."
Having exhibited to you my taxonomy of the facts of a case,
let me lighten your depression by pointing out that the taxonomy's
ten sorts of fact fall naturally into three groups, thus assisting the
processes of memory. The first six sorts of fact, involving aspects of
the physical universe, might be called in the aggregate matters of
matter. The seventh sort of fact, involving aspects of the interior
life, might be called matters of mind. The eighth, ninth, and tenth
sorts of fact, involving the inquiry whether a certain word or
phrase fits the case, might be called in the aggregate matters of
term.
When composing a novel or a tragedy, it is well to begin softly,
build by degrees to a crisis, and gradually wind down to a resolu-
tion of the mysteries and agonies which have gone before. A lecture
is no different. One begins softly and builds by degrees to a crisis. I
have begun. I have built. I come now to the crisis. It takes the form
1980]
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of a question. It is a question presently in the mind of all of you.
Were you less polite an audience, it would be on the tongue of not
a few of you. It is a simple question. It is a direct question. It is
this: what on earth is the use of your contraption? Taxonomy of
the facts of a case indeed! We are students who will and lawyers
who do try cases. We are judges who preside over cases. How will
your ten sorts of fact help us in our professional work? Isn't this
just that complication for the sake of complication with which we
are already too familiar? And if it is, we heap denunciation upon
your head and send you home to ponder what it is that law and life
are really all about.
Well, ladies and gentlemen, I want to answer your question. I
want to answer it because, unless I do, I can never get past the
crisis and on to the business of winding down, and winding down is
always the best part of a lecture. So much do I want to answer
your question that I shall answer it fives times. I say that there are
five uses for my taxonomy of the facts of a case, and although each
overlaps and shades off into the next, the best way of putting them
before you is to state and illustrate them one by one.
I begin with deftness, deftness of analysis. The more distinc-
tions you make, the readier your hand to untangle the tangle of
fact which most lawsuits present. Nuance is all, as every exper-
ienced trial lawyer knows, and nuance is impossible when you
paint with but a single brush.
Take an easy example. A lawyer must establish that his client
suffered a myocardial infarction which caused scarring to the mus-
cle of the heart. Should the lawyer tell me that that is the fact he
must prove, I will not quarrel with him. But later, after he has won
his case, I might insinuate to him that it is aesthetically more sat-
isfactory to take note of the separate facts which constitute his one
unparticularized sack of fact, and that it is possible, with my tax-
onomy, to give a different name to each of them. Ecce: the wavy
lines on the electrocardiogram tape are a fact of the first sort (or
perhaps of the second sort if a magnifying glass is necessary to see
them properly); that these lines are aptly described as those char-
acteristic of a myocardial infarction is a fact of the ninth sort; and
that someone who has suffered a myocardial infarction is left with
a scar on his heart muscle is a fact of the fifth sort.
For a second, more elaborate, example, I refer to Davis v.
[Vol. 3:345
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John Hancock Life Insurance Co.,9 an opinion whose persuasive-
ness is rather considerably enhanced for me by the happy circum-
stance that I wrote it myself.
A young woman said goodnight to her mother and went out
for the evening. She never returned. A week later, her body was
found on the roof of a tenement building. Those are facts of the
first sort. The medical examiner performed an autopsy, in the
course of which he made certain observations and measurements of
the internal viscera. Those are facts of the third sort. On the basis
of those observations and measurements, the medical examiner
concluded that the young woman had died of "acute and chronic
intravenous narcotism." That is a fact of the ninth sort. The young
woman owned a life insurance policy which provided that double
the face value would be paid to the beneficiary were the young wo-
man to die "solely from accidental bodily injury." The jury con-
cluded that death was accidental within the meaning of the word
as used in ordinary speech, which was the meaning it had in the
policy. That is a fact of the eighth sort.
I assert that deftness of analysis, being a virtue in itself, is its
own reward. Some of you may not be so sure. To enlist your con-
currence, let me discuss a second use of my taxonomy. It permits a
trial lawyer to prepare and prove his case with great delicacy of
focus. Recognizing differences in type among a multitude of facts,
the lawyer will marshal his evidence assuredly and exactly. Juries
regard this kind of precision as the seal of professional competence
and salute it with favorable verdicts.
For illustration, I use my taxonomy to help me think about
when it is that lay testimony will do and when it will not, the latter
contingency making it necessary for the proponent of the fact to
prove it by expert opinion testimony. For facts of the first and sec-
ond sorts, the object of sense perception assisted at most by binoc-
ulars, eyeglasses, or hearing aid, lay testimony does the job. For a
fact of the third sort, special skill is needed to drive the lunar land-
ing module or to use the medical instrument, but that is not the
same as to say that expert opinion testimony is necessary: once the
astronaut or laryngologist uses the special device or procedure,
what he perceives could have been perceived by anyone, even the
most inexpert. The testimony describing what was perceived is
therefore lay testimony. The fourth sort of fact is capable of being
9. 64 Misc. 2d 791, 316 N.Y.S.2d 722 (Civ. Ct. 1970).
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perceived, but by chance no one is available who did perceive it.
Here, we start with facts of the first sort. Recall my example of the
head-on collision with no survivors. Witnesses testify that, when
they came on the scene, the skid-marks were thus, the debris so,
etc. They perceived these things. Now, from such facts of the first
sort the jury is obliged to deduce the fact of the fourth sort-on
which side of the road did the cars collide-for that tells us which
driver crossed the line. Whether the jury must make the needful
deduction on its own or whether the jury may have the assistance
of expert opinion testimony will depend upon which of two rules is
preferred in that jurisdiction to determine the admissibility of an
expert opinion-a subject beyond my writ this evening but to be
set forth in an exquisite footnote to the printed text.10
The fifth and sixth sorts of fact, incapable of being perceived
because of the present limits of technology or the permanent
bounds on the capacity of science, will almost always be proved by
expert opinion testimony from a witness who possesses the requi-
site specialized knowledge.
The seventh sort of fact is a matter of mind. When the person
whose mental state is of interest testifies to that mental state, he
testifies on personal knowledge and consequently is a lay witness.
This might be treated as a fact of the first sort, except that we do
not "perceive" our own states of mind in the usual sense of the
word "perceive." When a witness states his perceptions of the per-
son whose mental state is of interest, we deal with facts of the first
sort. From those facts the jury will be told in many cases to infer
the actor's mental state. If the witness is permitted to characterize
those perceptions, for example, as "crazy," we deal with a matter
of term, a fact of the eighth sort. When a witness characterizes his
or another's perceptions of the person whose mental state is of in-
terest, for example, as "schizophrenic," we deal with a different
matter of term, a fact of the ninth sort.
The eighth sort of fact, a matter of term involving ordinary
10. One rule has it that an expert's opinion is admissible only when, without it, a jury
would be helpless to decide. E.g., Kulak v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 40 N.Y.2d 140, 351
N.E.2d 743, 386 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1976). The other requires merely that the expert's opinion
"assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Rule
702, Federal Rules of Evidence. Apply the former and the jury in our head-on collision case
must calculate on its own, from skid-marks, debris, etc., where the impact occurred. Stafford
v. Mussus Potato Chips, Inc., 39 A.D.2d 831, 333 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1972) (mem.). Let the latter
be the law and an expert in the reconstruction of accidents may give the jury his opinion.
Een v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 289 (D.N.D. 1954).
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words or phrases, a jury determines for itself. Average people,
which is what jurors are, can decide without help from anyone
whether the evidence before them meets a definition drawn from
everyday language. The ninth sort of fact, a matter of term which
is part of the vocabulary of some science or discipline other than
the law, must be proved by expert opinion testimony, for only an
expert will be able to define the term for the jury. The tenth sort
of fact, involving legal words or phrases, the jury determines by
applying the court's definition of the word or phrase to the facts of
other sorts in the case and deciding whether they fit.
This use of my taxonomy to organize the little I know about
the rules regarding lay testimony and expert opinion sets off in my
mind a different though related chain of thought. I seem to hear
myself pointing out that it is incorrect to label a witness lay or
expert at once, the label to remain in place so long as the witness is
on the stand. My purpose in calling the witness is to prove certain
facts. The witness' status will therefore vary with the sort of fact
about which the witness testifies. One moment the witness may be
a lay witness, the next an expert, and so on. To be sure I grasp my
point, I think of the treating physician. When he testifies that he
examined the plaintiff and felt a stiffness of the muscles of the
back of the neck he testifies to a fact of the first sort. He is a lay
witness. Now the physician says that, using a tongue depresser, he
looked down the plaintiff's throat and observed red, swollen patch-
es. This is a fact of the third sort: only a physician knows how to
use a depressor to hold down a patient's tongue, but once the de-
vice is in place, anyone can perceive the state of the patient's
throat. The physician is a lay witness. You see, I hope, that the
characterization turns on the subject of the testimony, not the title
of the witness. Proceeding, the physician says that these observa-
tions led him to diagnose a strep throat. That is a fact of the ninth
sort, provable only by expert opinion. The physician becomes an
expert witness at this point. "My bill was twenty dollars," he says,
as a lay witness. "That is the fair and reasonable value of my ser-
vices": he is an expert again.
The practical consequences of this fastidious discernment will
be plain to all of you. If nothing else, lay testimony is compellable,
expert testimony not." For the lay elements of his testimony, it
would have been proper to subpoena the physician. Only as to the
11. See, e.g., Hull v. Plume, 131 N.J.L. 511, 37 A.2d 53 (1944).
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diagnosis and the opinion on the value of his services were the
traditional arrangements for compensation necessary.
But there is a good deal else. Take a case like Meier v. Ross
General Hospital.12 Plaintiff's deceased had a long history of
mental trouble evidenced chiefly by attempts at suicide. He was
placed in the care of the defendant hospital, which, with
knowledge of the deceased's history, assigned him an unsecured
upper-story room. Result: defenestration. On which note the plain-
tiff rested. He had produced no expert opinion to the effect that
the hospital had been unreasonably careless, and the trial judge
thought this a deficiency. Let us analyze. The deceased's history
and the hospital's conduct are all facts of the first sort, proved by
lay testimony. The hospital's knowledge is a fact of the seventh
sort, a matter of mind, also proved by lay testimony that the hos-
pital's staff was told of the deceased's history. What remains? A
matter of term. Do these facts warrant the label "unreasonably
careless assignment of a room?" That is a phrase used in ordinary
discourse. It is not part of the vocabulary of any science or disci-
pline (that would be a fact of the ninth sort) and, while it is the
jargon of the law, we may treat it as a fact of the eighth sort as
well as a fact of the tenth sort because the term is used in everyday
speech with the same meaning it has for the law. Nothing before
the jury is beyond their unaided comprehension; the jury possesses
the necessary facts; and so the plaintiff has a prima facie case.
That is just what the California Supreme Court decided, though
for reasons innocent of anything like a taxonomy of facts.
So beguiled am I by this illustration of the utility of my taxon-
omy that I yield to the temptation to set forth another. Some of
you may have tried what over a martini is called a spleen-out case.
A little boy on his way to school is hit by a speeding car. The am-
bulance gets him to a hospital within minutes, where a surgeon
performs exploratory surgery. It is discovered that the boy's spleen
has been ruptured by the impact with the car. The surgeon
removes the injured organ, and the boy makes an uneventful re-
covery. He is now perfectly well, except that he lacks a spleen.
Plaintiff's counsel will argue that the spleen plays a vital though as
yet not fully understood role in the body's immunological system.
Lacking a spleen, the boy's life expectancy is short, and the
amount of the verdict should therefore be large. Discourse with
12. 60 Cal. 2d 420, 445 P.2d 519, 71 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1968).
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me. That the boy was hit by a car and taken to the hospital are
facts of the first sort: use lay witnesses to prove them. That a rup-
tured organ was found in the course of exploratory surgery is a fact
of the third sort. Only a surgeon can perform the surgery, but any-
one, layman or otherwise, who was present to perceive it may tes-
tify that a bit of tissue in the boy's abdomen was torn in two. That
this bit of tissue is the spleen is a fact of the ninth sort: someone
with medical training tells the jury that that is its name. Only the
surgeon knows how to remove the spleen. That it was removed is a
fact of the third sort: anyone who was there may testify that he
saw it done. The role of the spleen in the body's immunological
system is a fact of the sixth sort. Only an expert in immunology
may testify to it, giving his opinion on the spleen's properties.
I now seize the opportunity to suggest yet a third use of my
taxonomy. It permits one to mark out with great clarity the border
between a witness' terrain and the jury's. My illustration is Wash-
ington v. United States, s decided at a time when the District of
Columbia applied the Durham" rule to determine exculpation on
the ground of insanity. That rule, you will recall, provides that a
defendant is "not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the
product of mental disease or defect." The courts of the District
had fallen into the habit of permitting psychiatrists to testify that,
in their expert opinion, the defendant did have a mental disease or
defect, that the unlawful act was its product, and that the defen-
dant was consequently not guilty by reason of insanity. In Wash-
ington, the Court of Appeals condemned this practice and laid
down guidelines for psychiatric testimony in future cases. The phy-
sician is to diagnose; he is not to parrot back the Durham rule.
"The clinical diagnostic meaning of this term [mental disease or
defect]," said the court, "may be different from its legal mean-
ing.' " The facts with respect to the defendant's overt behavior are
facts of the first sort, we see: lay testimony suffices. That the struc-
ture of the defendant's personality is of a certain type is a matter
of term, a fact of the ninth sort, and a psychiatrist gives his opin-
ion on it. That the defense of insanity has or has not been made
out is a fact of the tenth sort-does the evidence fall within a legal
word or phrase as defined by the judge? This is a determination
13. 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
14. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
15. Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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solely for the jury to make, and hence expert opinion about it is
inadmissible.
A fourth use of my taxonomy is to explain certain appellate
decisions which are, without the taxonomy, a trifle confusing. We
all know the standard on review of a jury's finding. What then are
we to make of United States v. Simon?" The defendant account-
ants were convicted of certifying a false and misleading financial
statement. How they had treated certain transactions was not in
dispute. It was the quality of their treatment which was. Eight
"leaders of the [accounting] profession," to use Chief Judge
Friendly's words, "an impressive array of the leaders of the profes-
sion,' 17 testified that the defendants' treatment was consistent
with generally accepted accounting principles. The Government's
two experts, said the Chief Judge, "hardly compared with defen-
dants' witnesses in aggregate auditing experience or professional
eminence."18 In view of this, one might at first blush have expected
a reversal on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the
weight of the evidence. But slow! The Court of Appeals unani-
mously affirmed. Why? My taxonomy of the facts of a case shows
why. The entries the defendants made are facts of the first sort,
and in any event are not in controversy. That the defendants' pro-
fessional behavior was or was not consistent with good accounting
practice is a fact of the ninth sort: hence both sides called experts
in accountancy. But this fact of the ninth sort was not what the
jury had to determine. The indictment did not accuse the defen-
dants of failing to comply with generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples. Had that been the charge, it is likely that the Court of Ap-
peals would have reversed the conviction as contrary to the weight
of the evidence. The crime alleged in the indictment was different.
It was that the defendant had certified a false and misleading
financial statement. This is a fact of the tenth sort. Do the entries
on the statement make it false and misleading, as those words are
defined by the judge? The jury alone decides facts of the tenth
sort, which is why the disparity in the quality of the evidence ad-
duced by the defense as against that adduced by the Government
was of no moment.
The fifth and last use I will mention for my taxonomy is
16. 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970).
17. Id. at 805.
18. Id.
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merely a speculation, a possibility for further consideration. In the
last two or three years, the Chief Justice of the United States and
others have wondered aloud whether some cases are not too com-
plex to be tried by a jury. One trial judge has recently held that,
because the evidence was so voluminous in a case at law and the
issues so tricky, trial by jury would not be allowed: a bench trial
was mandatory.1 9 That kind of ruling is troublesome where there
exists a constitutional guarantee of jury trial, as in the seventh
amendment to the Constitution of the United States or as in vari-
ous state constitutions. The language of those constitutional guar-
antees typically runs something like this: "In suits at common law,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." If one asks what is
the scope of the guarantee, the response usually is historical, a ref-
erence to the forms of action. Since the Constitution preserves the
right to trial by jury in suits at common law, those forms of action
which were triable to a jury of old are triable to a jury today. A
contract case was tried to a jury in the time of Henry II. Then it is
tried to a jury in the time of Governor Clinton. That the evidence
is voluminous and the issues tricky counts for nothing. A judge
who rules otherwise may violate the Constitution. It's hard to see
any other conclusion if you define the constitutional guarantee of
jury trial by reference to the forms of action..
Now, our taxonomy of the facts of a case opens up a different
and perhaps more satisfactory approach to the problem. Yes, only
certain types of cases were tried to a jury in the time of Henry II.
But further, in that time only certain sorts of fact were determined
by juries-facts of the first, second, seventh, eighth, and tenth
sorts. Facts of the other sorts, which are just those sorts of fact
which tend to involve voluminous evidence and tricky issues, were
not determined by common law juries for the very good reason
that the life of the times was not complex enough to engender such
questions of fact. No jury before the last hundred years was ever
called upon to find monopoly power or the scientific basis of neu-
tron activation analysis. The energies of juries before the last four
or five decades were devoted to such questions as "Did Brown try
to separate the two fighting dogs?" or "Did Armory find a jewel in
the gutter?" Might one not argue, in light of all this, that the con-
stitutional guarantee of trial by jury extends only to facts of the
sort decided by juries at common law rather than to forms of ac-
19. Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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tion triable to a jury? Might one not argue that this gives the con-
stitutional guarantee of trial by jury a scope truly in accord with
its historical context? Might one not argue that this permits strik-
ing a better balance between the right of trial by jury and the exi-
gencies of complex litigation? I think these are possible arguments,
and for them, please note, we have my taxonomy of the facts of a
case to thank.
Well, ladies and gentlemen, my time is used up. It has been a
very great honor to me to deliver this lecture, and now, at its end,
we ought to be mindful of our reciprocal obligations. Mine, as
guest, is to say, "Thank you. Good night. It's been a wonderful
evening." And yours, as host, is to agree, no matter how mercilessly
I have abused your patience and your good nature.
